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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s disappointing holdings in the California 
Three Strikes cases have probably led many observers to conclude 
that there are no effective constitutional limits on excessively long 
prison sentences.  This Article argues the contrary, and makes three 
main points. 
First, any judgment of excessiveness (or disproportionality) re-
quires a normative framework—“excessive” relative to what?  The 
Court’s opinions have been very unhelpful in this regard, but three 
distinct proportionality principles are implicit in Eighth Amendment 
cases (and in many other areas of American, foreign, and interna-
tional law).  Litigators, courts, and scholars need to clearly state and 
make explicit use of these principles.  As summarized below, and 
more fully discussed in my previous writings,1 three of the most im-
portant and widespread examples of such principles are what I have 
called the limiting retributive, ends-benefits, and alternative-means 
proportionality principles.  The second and third principles are 
grounded in utilitarian philosophy; thus, they apply even if a jurisdic-
tion (with the Court’s apparent blessing) rejects retributive limits on 
lengthy prison terms designed to achieve crime control and other 
practical goals. 
Second, excessiveness, in one or more of the three senses dis-
cussed in Part I, is the common theme which underlies all three 
clauses of the Eighth Amendment.2  Litigators, courts, and scholars 
should explicitly recognize and apply this theme in prison-duration 
cases applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, drawing 
 
 * Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law, University of Minnesota. 
 1 See, e.g., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN 
AMERICAN LAW:  CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (forthcoming); Richard 
S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:  “Proportion-
ality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005). 
 2 These are the Excessive Bail Clause, the Excessive Fines Clause, and the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause. 
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on standards and practice under the other two clauses so that the 
Amendment achieves its essential goal—the protection of citizens 
from excessive government power. 
Third, the Eighth Amendment is not the only source of constitu-
tional limits on excessive prison terms.  Litigators in state court (as 
well as the judges of those courts and scholars) must consider the 
broader protections which may apply under the state constitution, 
particularly when (as is true in well over half of the states) state and 
federal constitutional sentencing provisions are worded differently.  
Indeed, even when these provisions are worded identically, many 
state courts have recognized their power to interpret state constitu-
tional law more favorably to offenders. 
I.  EXCESSIVE RELATIVE TO WHAT?  DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES 
Excessiveness and disproportionality are meaningless concepts in 
the absence of a clearly defined and defensible normative framework.  
It is therefore rather surprising that courts, when called upon to de-
termine constitutional limits on excessive punishments, have rarely 
stated, let alone sought to justify, any such framework.  Justice Scalia 
has repeatedly asserted that proportionality is inherently tied to re-
tributive theories of punishment,3 a concept that the majority of the 
Court has thus far refused to expressly endorse.  But in fact, there are 
at least two well-established non-retributive proportionality doctrines, 
which will be discussed after an initial clarification of the applicable 
retributive principles.  As discussed below, each of these three pro-
portionality principles has strong historical and academic support.  
And as will be shown in Part II, the same three principles are also im-
plicit in many of the Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions. 
A.  Limiting Retributive Proportionality 
There is extensive literature on retributive (or “just deserts”) pun-
ishment theories.4  For present purposes, the most important and 
 
 3 E.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Proportional-
ity—the notion that the punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied to 
the penological goal of retribution.”); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) 
(opinion of Scalia, J.) (describing proportionality as a retributive concept in part of an 
opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
 4 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16–17 (4th ed. 2006) (discuss-
ing retributivism as a theory of punishment); JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING:  ESSAYS 
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widely accepted principles of these theories may be summarized as 
follows.  Unlike utilitarianism or other consequentialist theories, re-
tributive theories ignore the offender’s probable future conduct or 
the effects that the punishment might have on crime rates or other-
wise.  Instead, the retributive theory focuses on the actor’s degree of 
blameworthiness for his or her past actions, and in particular, on 
both the nature and seriousness of the harm foreseeably caused or 
threatened by the crime, and the offender’s degree of culpability in 
committing the crime—namely, his or her intent (mens rea), motive, 
role in the offense, possible diminished capacity to obey the law, and 
so forth.  Some retributive scholars believe that prior convictions are 
irrelevant to this assessment, while other such scholars accept that 
prior crimes modestly increase an offender’s blameworthiness.5 
Some scholars believe desert principles should define the degree 
of punishment severity as precisely as possible.  As elaborated by writ-
ers such as Andrew von Hirsch, this precise-desert theory permits 
crime-control, budgetary, or other non-retributive values to affect the 
choice among penalties of more or less equal severity, as well as the 
overall scale of punishment severity, as determined by the most and 
least severe penalties.6  But within that scale, this theory requires strict 
“ordinal” retributive proportionality in the relative severity of penal-
ties imposed on different offenders.7  This version of retributive the-
ory is clearly too narrow for constitutional purposes, since it leaves lit-
tle room for the operation of non-retributive values and goals in 
individual cases.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
Eighth Amendment permits state and federal governments to pursue 
a variety of non-retributive sentencing goals.8 
A more modest theory, often referred to as “limiting retributiv-
ism,” allows non-retributive punishment purposes to be applied 
 
IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 217–21 (1970) (explaining strong and weak retributiv-
ism). 
 5 Compare ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES:  DESERVEDNESS AND 
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 88–91 (1985) (arguing that repeat of-
fenders deserve somewhat greater punishment), with GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING 
CRIMINAL LAW 460–66 (1978) (questioning whether a prior record should increase an of-
fender’s culpability to any degree).  See generally Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Re-
cord in the Sentencing Process, in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 303, 317–20 
(Michael Tonry ed., 1997) (discussing the issue of criminal record in theories of punish-
ment). 
 6 See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993). 
 7 See, e.g., id. 
 8 See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (listing permissible non-
retributive sentencing goals in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy, who provided the necessary votes to affirm, albeit on the narrowest grounds). 
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within a range defined by upper and lower desert-based limits—
penalties must not be clearly too severe nor clearly too lenient, rela-
tive to the offender’s just deserts.9  One widely cited version of this 
theory was proposed by Norval Morris, who viewed retributive assess-
ments as imprecise and therefore posited a range of “not unde-
served” penalties.10  Other writers have proposed flexible retributive 
limits on different grounds, emphasizing the special importance of 
avoiding unfairly severe penalties.  For example, the philosopher 
K.G. Armstrong wrote that justice grants 
the right to punish offenders up to some limit, but one is not necessarily 
and invariably obliged to punish to the limit of justice. . . .  For a variety of 
reasons (amongst them the hope of reforming the criminal) the appro-
priate authority may choose to punish a man less than it is entitled to, but 
it is never just to punish a man more than he deserves.11 
As shown in the cases discussed in Part II of this Article, the Su-
preme Court’s implicit invocations of desert principles are consistent 
with a limiting retributivism theory, especially one which emphasizes 
the prevention of excessively severe penalties.  This approach finds 
support in the text of two of the three Eighth Amendment clauses 
 
 9 Limiting retributive principles also apply to issues of criminal liability, as well as the sever-
ity of punishment; only blameworthy persons may be convicted and made eligible for 
punishment.  See generally SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 1, at ch. 6. 
 10 NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974).  Morris’s theory is elaborated in 
Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83–119 (Mi-
chael Tonry ed., 2004).  See also Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing:  
The Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 168–
72 (1996) (arguing that Eighth Amendment proportionality should be construed in ac-
cordance with Morris’s theory); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive 
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677 (2005) (proposing Eighth Amendment retributive limits).  
Morris’s limiting retributive theory has been adopted as the theoretical framework for the 
revised Model Penal Code sentencing provisions.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a) 
cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (“Subsection (2)(a) . . . borrows from the theoretical 
writings of Norval Morris.”).  But see Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Re-
form, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006) (arguing that the concept of deserved 
punishment is too elastic, opaque, and non-falsifiable to provide meaningful limits on 
punishment severity; however, Ristroph recognizes that crime-control sentencing goals 
are also rather elastic and opaque, and that such goals have often been used to justify se-
vere penalties, notwithstanding the greater potential, in theory at least, for using empiri-
cal evidence to falsify such claims). 
 11 K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT:  A 
COLLECTION OF PAPERS 138, 155 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969); see also H.L.A. HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:  ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 237 (1968) 
(“[M]any self-styled retributivists treat appropriateness to the crime as setting a maximum 
within which penalties [are chosen on crime-control grounds] . . . .”).  See generally Frase, 
supra note 10, at 92–94 (stating that numerous authors and model codes emphasize strict 
desert limits on maximum severity, with looser requirements of minimum sanction sever-
ity). 
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(forbidding excessive bail and excessive fines), and is also consistent 
with the essential role of constitutional guarantees as protectors of 
human rights, and as bulwarks against unfairness and abuse of gov-
ernmental power. 
B.  Non-Retributive Proportionality 
Utilitarian (or consequentialist) purposes of punishment focus on 
the desirable effects (mainly, future crime reduction) which punish-
ments have on the offender being punished, or on other would-be of-
fenders, and on the costs and undesired consequences of punish-
ments.12  The most widely accepted of these purposes are the 
following:  special (or individual, or specific) deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation of the offender (because he is thought likely 
to commit further crimes); general deterrence of other would-be vio-
lators through fear of receiving similar punishment; and a more dif-
fuse, long-term form of deterrence (sometimes referred to as expres-
sive or denunciation purposes) which focuses on the norm-defining 
and norm-reinforcing effects that penalties have on the public’s views 
about the relative seriousness, harmfulness, or wrongness of various 
crimes.13 
From a utilitarian perspective, a penalty can be disproportionate 
(or excessive) in two distinct and independent ways corresponding to 
the ends-benefits and alternative means proportionality principles 
described below:  1) the costs and burdens of the sentence (or the 
added costs and burdens, compared to a lesser penalty) may out-
weigh the likely benefits (or added benefits) produced by the sen-
tence; or 2) the sentence may be disproportionate (that is, unneces-
sary and therefore excessive) when compared to other, less costly or 
less burdensome means of achieving the same goals.  Each of these 
utilitarian proportionality principles has ancient roots, as discussed 
more fully below. 
 
 12 See generally DRESSLER, supra note 4, at 14–16 (providing a general background on the 
utilitarian justifications behind criminal punishment); Richard S. Frase, Punishment Pur-
poses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2005) (explaining how judges should consider the purpose of 
punishment determining sentences). 
 13 See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1282, 1286–89 
(Joshua Dressler ed., 3d ed. 2002) (explaining utilitarian justifications for punishment).  
See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 
(1997) (providing utilitarian arguments for punishments based on desert). 
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1.  Ends-Benefits Proportionality 
This principle has been recognized by utilitarian philosophers 
since the eighteenth century.  Cesare Beccaria maintained that 
criminal penalties should be proportional to the seriousness of the 
offense, as measured by the social harm caused or threatened by the 
offense.14  Jeremy Bentham elaborated several more specific utilitar-
ian arguments for punishing in proportion to the seriousness of the 
crime.15  First, he argued that “[t]he greater an offence is, the greater 
reason there is to hazard a severe punishment for the chance of pre-
venting it”—that is, greater social harm justifies greater preventive ef-
fort and expense.16  Second, Bentham argued that a scale of penalties 
proportionate to social harm would give offenders “a motive to stop 
at the lesser” crime.17  Third, he argued that “the evil of the punish-
ment [should not exceed] the evil of the offence.”18  In addition to 
public costs, punishments impose suffering on offenders (and also 
often on their families), and such suffering should not be dispropor-
tionate to the seriousness of the crime(s) which the punishment 
hopes to prevent. 
The utilitarian ends-benefits principle and retributive proportion-
ality both require proportionality relative to an offense’s severity, but 
the two theories measure such severity differently.  Utilitarian theory 
punishes in proportion to the harm caused or threatened by the of-
fense, but only when and to the extent that such punishment will 
prevent future crimes by this offender or others.  On the other hand, 
utilitarian theory considers not only the harm associated with a par-
ticular act similar to the defendant’s, but also the aggregate harm 
caused by all such actions, and the difficulty of detecting and deter-
ring such actions.  As for the second retributive element of offense 
severity, offender culpability (as determined by intent, motive, etc.), 
 
 14 See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 21–28 (Adolph Caso 
ed., Int’l Pocket Library 4th ed. 1992) (1764). 
 15 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (R. Hildreth trans., Trübner & Co. 
4th ed. 1882) (1789). 
 16 Id. at 326 (emphasis omitted). 
 17 Id. (emphasis omitted); see also BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 28 (“If an equal punishment 
be ordained for two crimes that injure society in different degrees, there is nothing to de-
ter men from committing the greater, as often as it is attended with greater advantage.”); 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY:  AN ANALYSIS 
OF RECENT RESEARCH 41–43 (1999) (discussing the marginal deterrent benefits of penal-
ties proportioned to harms associated with different crimes). 
 18 BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 323; see also HART, supra note 11, at 173 n.20 (describing the 
“simple Utilitarian ground that the law should not inflict greater suffering than it is likely 
to prevent”). 
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utilitarians consider culpability factors only when and to the extent 
that they are related to the likely future benefits of punishment (for 
example, the dangerousness and deterrability of this offender or oth-
ers).  Finally, in choosing the proper sentence for a particular of-
fender or group of similar offenders, utilitarian theory considers not 
only the actual crime control or other benefits produced by sanc-
tions, but also any undesirable consequences of the sanction.  Such 
consequences might include perverse incentives produced by harsh 
penalties (such as when such penalties encourage offenders to kill 
potential witnesses or arresting officers).  Another example would be 
the tendency for disproportionate penalties to undermine the pub-
lic’s sense of the relative gravity of different crimes, and cause a pub-
lic loss of respect for, and willingness to obey and cooperate with, 
criminal justice authorities.  As the philosopher H.L.A. Hart said, 
“[if] the relative severity of penalties diverges sharply from this rough 
scale [of proportionality], there is a risk of either confusing common 
morality or flouting it and bringing the law into contempt.”19 
2.  Alternative-Means Proportionality 
Utilitarian efficiency values require that, among equally effective 
means to achieve a given end, those that are less costly or burden-
some should be preferred.  This has sometimes been referred to as 
the principle of parsimony,20 and like the ends-benefits principle dis-
cussed above, it has been recognized since the eighteenth century.  
Cesare Beccaria argued that all punishments should be “necessary; 
the least possible in the case given.”21  Jeremy Bentham similarly held 
that punishment itself is evil and should be used as sparingly as possi-
ble; in particular, a penalty should not be used “in cases where the 
same end may be obtained by means more mild.”22  In modern times, 
 
 19 HART, supra note 11, at 25.  See generally Robinson & Darley, supra note 13 (arguing for a 
criminal law system based on the community’s ideas of desert); MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 1.02(2)(a), reporter’s n.o (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (addressing the concern for 
moral legitimacy in sentencing). 
 20 See, e. g., MORRIS, supra note 10, at 60–61, 75, 78 (describing parsimony as the “least re-
strictive—least punitive—sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes”). 
 21 BECCARIA, supra note 14, at 99. 
 22 BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 323.  Similar means proportionality principles were endorsed 
in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, Aug. 26, 1789, reprinted in 
FRANK MALOY ANDERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS 
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE:  1789-1901, at 15, 58–60 (1904).  Article 8 of 
the Declaration limited punishments to those that are “strictly and obviously necessary.”  
Id. at 59.  Article 9 specified that, to protect the presumption of innocence, “if it is 
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alternative-means proportionality principles have frequently been 
endorsed by scholars and model code drafters.23  And as will be shown 
in Part II, unnecessarily severe penalties and other criminal justice 
measures have been condemned in numerous federal and state court 
opinions. 
3.  Distinguishing and Applying Proportionality Principles 
Ends and means proportionality assessments are conceptually dis-
tinct, but some cases might seem to incorporate elements of both.  
Although ends proportionality evaluates the excessiveness of a meas-
ure relative to the benefits likely to be achieved, rather than alterna-
tive means of achieving those benefits, some ends proportionality as-
sessments also involve comparisons to alternative means.  This is the 
case when an allegedly excessive measure adds some additional net 
benefit, but also produces additional net costs or burdens relative to 
an alternative measure.  The ends-benefits proportionality question 
in such a case is whether the greater costs or burdens of the chal-
lenged measure (compared to the alternative measure) exceed (or 
grossly exceed) the likely added benefits of the challenged measure.  
For example, if a court were to conclude that, in a given category of 
cases, life without parole (“LWOP”) does add some constitutionally 
recognized net benefit that would not be achieved by the alternative 
of life with parole, the court would then need to ask whether the 
 
thought indispensable to arrest him, all severity that may not be necessary to secure his 
person ought to be strictly suppressed by law.”  Id. 
 23 See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 10, at 60–61 (“The principle of parsimony infuses the rec-
ommendations of the two national crime commissions of the past decade.”); FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:  THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN 
CALIFORNIA 189–91 (2001) (describing classes of excessive punishment claims); Margaret 
Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death:  Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1043–56 (1978) (discussing dignity and excessiveness 
in light of utilitarian theories of punishment); Richard G. Singer, Sending Men to Prison:  
Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as 
Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 51, 72–89 (1972) (explaining the 
least drastic alternative doctrine); Michael Tonry, Parsimony and Desert in Sentencing, in 
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING:  READINGS ON THEORY & POLICY 202 (Andrew von Hirsch & An-
drew Ashworth eds., 2d. ed. 1998) (“[J]udges should be directed to impose the least se-
vere sentence consistent with the governing purposes at sentencing.” (emphasis omit-
ted)).  Notably, “[t]he Model Penal Code and all three editions of the [American Bar 
Association] sentencing standards explicitly or implicitly recognized the principle of par-
simony.”  Frase, supra note 10, at 94–95.  The principle is also endorsed in the proposed 
revisions of the Model Penal Code sentencing provisions.  MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 1.02(2)(a)(iii) cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (“[T]he rule of parsimony states a 
logical truism—punishments beyond those ‘necessary’ are by definition gratuitous.”). 
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added costs and burdens of LWOP exceed the added benefits.  On 
the other hand, if the court concluded that LWOP adds no net bene-
fit that could not be achieved by means of less severe penalties, it 
would then need to engage in alternative-means analysis. 
It should be stressed that each of the two utilitarian proportional-
ity principles described above can be tailored to the particular legal 
context.  This could involve varying the form in which the principle is 
applied (as a broad standard, a simpler decision rule, or some mix of 
these).  Each principle’s strictness of application can also be varied.  
For example, alternative-means principles need not require the iden-
tification of the least costly or burdensome option; in some contexts 
it may be appropriate to only forbid options which are clearly or sig-
nificantly more costly or burdensome. 
Eighth Amendment litigators, courts, and scholars must further 
recognize important differences between public policy and constitu-
tional proportionality analysis when applying the two utilitarian pro-
portionality principles described above.  In public policy analysis, the 
costs of a measure are very important elements; in proportionality 
analysis, measures should not cost more than the benefits they are 
expected to produce (including public as well as privately borne costs 
and burdens), or more than equally effective alternative measures.  
But when defining a defendant’s constitutional right to not be sub-
jected to an excessive sentence, the crime control and other benefits 
of the sentence should probably be weighed only against the burdens 
that the sentence imposes on the defendant (ends proportionality), 
and alternative measures should be examined only in terms of their 
respective burdens on the defendant (means proportionality).  The 
constitutional argument is that it is fundamentally unfair to impose 
severe burdens that greatly outweigh the expected public benefits, or 
to impose such burdens when effective alternative measures are 
much less burdensome.  As a matter of sound public policy, it is also 
unwise, but probably not fundamentally unfair to the defendant, to 
impose a sentence which costs taxpayers more than the expected 
benefits are worth, or more than an effective alternative. 
Even with this adjustment, some critics might argue that utilitarian 
principles do not provide a proper basis for deriving constitutional 
rights.  But as I have argued in previous writings,24 utilitarian ends 
 
 24 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 1; Frase, supra note 1; see also Richard S. Frase, What 
Were They Thinking?  Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 389–94 (2002) [hereinafter Frase, Unreasonableness] (analyzing the 
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and means proportionality principles are implicit in much of the 
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.  For example, the factors under-
lying the Court’s Fourth Amendment “balancing” test incorporate 
both of these principles, and a violation of one or both principles 
makes a search or seizure “unreasonable” and thus unconstitutional.  
Nor does it seem plausible to argue that the textual and contextual 
differences between the Fourth and Eighth Amendments require ex-
clusion of utilitarian proportionality principles from the latter—
especially since, as will be shown in Part II, these principles are im-
plicit in many Eighth Amendment cases. 
Another difference between public policy and constitutional pro-
portionality analysis relates to the inherent limits of constitutional 
limit-setting.  Public policy strives for as close a fit as possible between 
costs and benefits, and as efficient a choice as possible among alter-
native means.  But when courts seek to enforce constitutional propor-
tionality limits on sentencing (or on other government measures), 
they should only intervene if the burdens on the defendant are 
clearly excessive relative to the benefits, or if alternative sanctions or 
other measures are clearly less burdensome and equally effective.25  
These inherent limits on judicial review decisions are reflected (but 
to a very exaggerated degree)26 in the Supreme Court’s requirements 
of “gross disproportionality” under the Eighth Amendment. 
On the other hand, the appropriate deference courts should pay 
to policy decisions and case-specific assessments made by legislatures, 
executive officials, and lower courts must not be used as an excuse for 
total abdication of judicial responsibility to protect defendants from 
 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis used by the Supreme Court in numerous 
cases). 
 25 Cf. Roy G. Spece, Jr., Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny and the Least Restrictive Alternative as a 
Superior Form of Intermediate Review:  Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment as a Case 
Study, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1049, 1054–56 (1979) (noting the difference between requiring 
choice of the “least” versus a “significantly less” burdensome alternative). 
 26 See Frase, supra note 1, at 574, which notes that the Supreme Court’s cases leave great 
doubt as to when—if ever—a severe prison sentence will be found to violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  An analogous, but less extreme, disconnect between the Court’s standards 
and decisions applying those standards can be found in Fourth Amendment cases.  In this 
context, the Court says it is “balancing” the invasion of the citizen’s privacy, property, or 
liberty interests against the government’s interest in searching or seizing.  The balancing 
framework implies the pursuit of an optimum balance which, as suggested in text, is more 
appropriate for sub-constitutional public policy analysis.  But in practice, the scales often 
seem tipped in the government’s favor so that a search or seizure is unlikely to be found 
“unreasonable” unless the balance weighs very strongly in the citizen’s favor.  See generally 
Frase, Unreasonableness, supra note 24 (providing specific examples of how the Court has 
conducted its Fourth Amendment “balancing” in recent decisions). 
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abuse of governmental power.  All three of the proportionality prin-
ciples described above (limiting retributive, ends-benefits, and alter-
native-means) are well established in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence,27 and courts should not hesitate to apply them.  Nor should 
courts be deterred by the seeming subjectivity of the qualifying lan-
guage suggested above, reflecting the inherent limits of judicial re-
view.  A standard of “clear” excessiveness, relative to retributive, ends-
benefits, and/or alternative-means proportionality principles, is no 
more subjective than other standards commonly applied by reviewing 
courts, such as “reasonableness,” “compelling state interest,” “fair no-
tice,” and “abuse of discretion.” 
II.  THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S COMMON THEME:  PREVENTING 
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT MEASURES 
Although some justices on the Court continue to argue that the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only prohibits barbarous 
penalties, such as burning convicts alive,28 the majority of the Court 
has long agreed that, like the Excessive Bail and Excessive Fines 
Clauses, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause limits excessive-
ness despite the absence of that word in the constitutional text.29  This 
view has historical support,30 and reflects the idea that the clauses of 
 
 27 See SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 1; Frase, supra note 1. 
 28 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the Eighth Amendment bans types of punishments, not excessive sentences); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965–86 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (examining the Eighth 
Amendment’s origins to conclude that it did not ban excessive punishment, in an opin-
ion joined on this point only by Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
 29 See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14–31 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (reviewing the Court’s past 
decisions and analyzing the case before them in light of the sentence’s proportionality); 
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996–1008 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that the Eighth 
Amendment includes a “proportionality principle”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 367 (1910) (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires punishments to be 
“graduated and proportioned to [the] offense”); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 
(1983) (“The final clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences 
that are disproportionate to the crime committed.”). 
 30 See, e.g., LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
(1975) (reviewing numerous types of punishment held to be cruel and unusual, and the 
analyses behind them); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1049, 1063–65 (2004) (“The idea that grossly excessive punishments are cruel and 
unusual punishment is not new; it was part of the English law for hundreds of years be-
fore the founding of the United States.”); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Inflicted:”  The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969) (exploring the 
historical relationship between the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment and the English Bill of Rights of 1689).  But see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 
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the Eighth Amendment share a common theme.  It is therefore use-
ful to briefly examine principles established under the Excessive Bail 
and Excessive Fines Clauses to see how “excessive” has been defined 
in those contexts.  Of course, even a common theme or concept can 
appropriately be applied differently in different contexts.  But if the 
applications are dramatically different, the burden is on those who 
favor such widely differing applications to justify them.  The starting 
point is to examine the extent of the differences, as well as the stan-
dards being applied. 
A.  Excessive Bail 
The Eighth Amendment’s Bail Clause would seem to have very lit-
tle to do with the other two clauses of the Eighth Amendment, since 
bail issues arise prior to conviction and the resulting pretrial deten-
tion is not intended—or even constitutionally permitted—as a form 
of punishment.31  But it turns out that the constitutional standards de-
fining excessive bail clearly reflect one of the utilitarian proportional-
ity principles described above.32 
The prohibitions of “excessive” bail found in the Eighth Amend-
ment and in many state constitutions imply some sort of proportion-
ality limit, but courts have had few occasions to interpret the meaning 
of these provisions.  The sole Supreme Court ruling to date to ad-
dress the issue was Stack v. Boyle,33 wherein the Court, having stated 
that the purpose of bail is to assure the presence of the accused at 
trial and other hearings, concluded that “[b]ail set at a figure higher 
than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘exces-
sive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”34  This standard implicitly in-
 
965–86 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (containing an extended, contrary analysis of the Amend-
ment’s original meaning that is joined only by Justice Rehnquist). 
 31 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–52 (1987) (holding that pre-conviction 
preventive detention would violate substantive due process if it was intended as punish-
ment or was excessive relative to all valid non-punitive purposes). 
 32 Utilitarian proportionality principles are also implicit in a number of other constitutional 
limitations on pretrial and trial criminal procedures.  See, e.g., SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra 
note 1, at ch. 5; Frase, supra note 1, at 611–17.  In particular, as was noted previously, both 
ends and means proportionality principles are implicit in Fourth Amendment cases de-
fining “unreasonable” searches and seizures.  And the latter measures, like bail and pre-
trial detention, are imposed prior to conviction and are not permissible forms of pun-
ishment. 
 33 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
 34 Id. at 5.  But see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754–55 (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not 
require setting bail at all, and that the state’s legitimate interests include prevention of 
further crime and/or threats to witnesses, as well as prevention of flight). 
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vokes alternative-means proportionality:  a bail amount is “excessive” 
if it is unnecessarily high, in the sense that a lower bail would have 
achieved all of the government’s legitimate interests. 
B.  Excessive Fines 
Prohibitions on excessive fines can be traced to the Magna Carta 
(1215),35 and were included in the English Bill of Rights (1689),36 
Founding Era state bills of rights,37 and the Eighth Amendment.38  But 
the Supreme Court did not have occasion to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment provision until the end of the twentieth century, and 
even then only in the context of civil and criminal forfeitures, not 
cases involving actual fines (which, at this writing, still have never 
come before the Court).  Limiting retributive proportionality princi-
ples are fairly well-defined in Supreme Court and lower court cases, 
but courts have failed to recognize and articulate proportionality 
principles suitable for defining constitutional excessiveness relative to 
the non-retributive (deterrent) purposes served by fines, forfeitures, 
and civil penalties. 
In United States v. Alexander39 and Austin v. United States,40 the Court 
held that criminal, in personam forfeitures (Alexander) and civil, in 
rem forfeitures (Austin) might, under some circumstances, constitute 
excessive fines.  Although in rem forfeiture actions are, at least in 
form, directed at property rather than persons, and do not require 
the property’s owner to have been criminally convicted, prosecuted, 
or even charged, the Court held in Austin that the key issue is not 
whether a forfeiture is classified as civil/in rem or criminal/in per-
sonam, but rather whether the measure constitutes “punishment,” at 
least in part, as opposed to being purely “remedial.”41  The Court fur-
ther held that a measure imposes punishment if it serves retributive 
 
 35 MAGNA CARTA §§ 20–21 (Eng. 1215), reprinted in WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA 
CARTA:  A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 284–98 (2d ed. 1914) 
(providing that fines should be graded according to offense seriousness, and also should 
not deprive the offender of his livelihood). 
 36 English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2 (Eng.). 
 37 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989) (noting 
that at least eight states ratifying the Constitution had some equivalent of the Excessive 
Fines Clause in their state constitutions or declarations of rights). 
 38 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 39 509 U.S. 544, 558–59 (1993). 
 40 509 U.S. 602, 609–10, 621–23 (1993). 
 41 Id. at 609–10 (“[T]he question is not . . . whether forfeiture . . . is civil or criminal, but 
rather whether it is punishment.”). 
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or deterrent purposes;42 purely remedial measures are designed to 
compensate the government for enforcement costs and/or lost reve-
nues.  The Court then remanded the case without attempting to de-
fine a standard for determining the excessiveness issue.43 
In United States v. Bajakajian,44 the Court did provide such a stan-
dard and used it, in an in personam criminal forfeiture case, to hold 
that the Excessive Fines Clause would be violated by full forfeiture of 
$357,144 in cash which the defendant had failed to report when at-
tempting to take it out of the country.45  Justice Thomas’s majority 
opinion applied a “grossly disproportional” standard to the gravity of 
the offense the forfeiture is designed to punish, citing Solem v. Helm, 
but not the more recent case of Harmelin v. Michigan (both cases are 
discussed in Part II.C.3, below).46  Applying this standard, Justice 
Thomas stressed several aspects of Bajakajian’s offense:  (1) the tech-
nical nature of the crime (in this case, the non-reporting of a cash 
transport which, itself, was perfectly legal); (2) the trial court’s find-
ing that the crime was unrelated to any other illegal activities; (3) the 
fact that the defendant did not fall into any of the groups targeted by 
the statute (money launderers, drug traffickers, tax evaders); (4) the 
defendant’s recommended sentence under the Sentencing Guide-
lines (six months incarceration and a $5,000 fine), which the Court 
viewed as a better measure of his culpability relative to other violators 
of the statute than the much higher statutory maximum penalties; 
and 5) the minimal harm to the government caused by defendant’s 
non-reporting.47 
The harm and culpability factors stressed in Bajakajian correspond 
to the two traditional elements of blameworthiness, suggesting a the-
ory of limiting retributive proportionality.48  But as noted above, for-
 
 42 Id. at 621–22 (holding that a civil sanction that “can only be explained as . . . serving 
either retributive or deterrent purposes [in addition to any remedial purpose], is 
punishment, as we have come to understand the term” (quoting United States v. Halper, 
490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)). 
 43 Id. at 622–23 (“[Petitioner] asks that we establish a multifactor test for determining 
whether a forfeiture is constitutionally ‘excessive.’  We decline that invitation.”  (citation 
omitted)). 
 44 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
 45 Id. at 334–40. 
 46 Id. at 337. 
 47 Id. at 337–40. 
 48 See Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual:  The Autonomous Excessive Fines Clause 
and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeitures After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 461, 492–98 (contrasting the Bajakajian majority’s desert-based approach with 
the dissent’s utilitarian one); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”:  The Due Process Clause, 
Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 901 (2004) (noting the 
 
  
Dec. 2008] LIMITING EXCESSIVE PRISON SENTENCING 53 
 
feitures may constitute “punishment” if they serve deterrent pur-
poses.  So unless the Court is going to impose retributive limits on de-
terrent purposes (which it has refused to do in the context of prison 
sentences, discussed below in Part II.C.3), the Court needs to develop 
standards of utilitarian “excessiveness.”  It can be argued that some 
severe forfeitures impose burdens out of proportion to the law en-
forcement benefits achieved (ends-benefits proportionality), and are 
also excessive in their unnecessary severity and overinclusiveness (al-
ternative-means proportionality).49 
Subsequent forfeiture cases in federal and state courts have usu-
ally distinguished Bajakajian and upheld the forfeiture,50 but a few 
cases have found an excessive fines violation.51  As a number of schol-
ars have noted,52 courts have seemed more willing to invalidate exces-
sive forfeitures than excessive prison terms.  Some have argued that 
differences between these contexts support stricter constitutional re-
view of forfeitures.  But the differences cut in both directions.53 
 
majority’s retributivist focus); Rachel A. Van Cleave, “Death Is Different,” Is Money Different?  
Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages—Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for 
Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 217, 251–52 (2003) (contrasting 
the majority and dissenting opinions in Bajakajian in their interpretation of the same 
standard). 
 49 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application of Substantive Due Process:  A Tale of 
Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453, 482 (1997) (providing the example of a Michigan 
law that was overinclusive in its goal of deterring crime). 
 50 See, e.g., United States v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that forfei-
ture of defendant’s $900,000 equity in his apartment following fraud and drug convic-
tions was not excessive); see also United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 
2005) (upholding a forfeiture of $5.4 million in lottery winnings from a ticket purchased 
with drug proceeds after noting that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to contra-
band, fruits, or proceeds of illegal activity).  But see United States v. 3814 NW Thurman 
St., 164 F.3d 1191, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 1999) (seeming to adopt a narrow view of which 
fruits of criminal activity are excluded from Excessive Fines protection). 
 51 E.g., 3814 NW Thurman St., 164 F.3d at 1198 (invalidating forfeiture of a $200,686 in-
crease in the property owner’s equity when a fraudulently obtained loan was partly used 
to reduce liens on the property); One Car, 1996 Dodge X-Cab Truck v. State, 122 S.W.3d 
422 (Tex. App. 2003) (invalidating forfeiture of a truck worth $11,000 that contained 
trace amounts of methamphetamine); People v. Malone, 923 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1995) (holding that the statutory maximum $100,000 fine imposed for an offense 
involving $400 of property damage violated Colorado and federal excessive fines provi-
sions). 
 52 E.g., Van Cleave, supra note 48. 
 53 Karlan, supra note 48, at 903–14, argues that punitive damages awards justify stricter con-
stitutional scrutiny than prison sentences because the former cannot be reviewed by lower 
federal courts; they are imposed by untrained local juries, not judges and legislators; and 
they can be objectively compared to the compensatory damages award in the same case.  
It might also be argued that all sentencing issues assume a culpable, convicted offender, 
whereas forfeitures do not.  On the other hand, damages do not involve physical liberty, 
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C.  Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
This clause has been applied to a wide variety of issues:  death 
penalty eligibility; execution methods; length of prison terms; and 
the treatment of convicted prisoners (prison conditions, use of force, 
discipline).  The standards applied in different contexts within this 
clause vary almost as much as the standards applied across the three 
Eighth Amendment clauses. 
1.  Death Penalty Eligibility 
Like forfeitures, the use of capital punishment appears to be lim-
ited by retributive principles which trump crime-control goals.  In a 
number of cases, the Court has held that capital punishment would 
be “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the [defendant’s] 
crime.”54  This standard appears to invoke limiting retributive princi-
ples, since the Court’s decisions focus on traditional retributive sen-
tencing factors:  harm and culpability.55 
A second standard, supposedly independent of the first, invali-
dates the death penalty when it “makes no measurable contribution 
 
and typical, well-financed civil defendants can better defend themselves than most crimi-
nal defendants.  Moreover, trial judges can set aside excessive damages awards, but crimi-
nal defendants often have no effective appellate review or other sub-constitutional reme-
dies against excessive prison terms.  It is therefore striking that in at least three respects—
de novo review, more frequent use of comparative analysis, and more lenient treatment 
of recidivists (only violations of a similar nature, committed in the same state, may be 
used to justify a punitive damages award)—the Court seems to be much more protective 
of a civil defendant’s bank account than it has been of a criminal defendant’s liberty.  See 
generally Frase, supra note 1. 
 54 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 55 Compare Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits capital punishment for the rape of a child where the rapist did not 
cause or intend to cause the child’s death), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 
(2005) (finding that offenders who were under age eighteen at the time of the offense 
should not face the death penalty because they cannot be held to the same standards as 
adults), Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (holding that mentally retarded of-
fenders are less culpable and therefore should not be executed), Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 800–01 (1982) (finding that a felony murder accomplice’s limited intent and 
minor role in the offense prevented application of the death penalty), and Coker, 433 U.S. 
at 598 (“[I]n terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, 
[the rape of an adult woman] does not compare with murder [in determining punish-
ment] . . . .”), with Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that an accom-
plice’s major participation in a felony resulting in death, combined with reckless indiffer-
ence to human life, made him constitutionally eligible to receive the death penalty).  
Scholars have also emphasized retributive principles.  See, e.g., Radin, supra note 23, at 
1056 (“[A] punishment is excessive and unconstitutional . . . if it inflicts more pain than 
the individual deserves . . . .”). 
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to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than 
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.”56  
The “acceptable goals” recognized by the Court include retribution 
and deterrence.57  This standard might only invoke a minimal rational 
basis standard,58 but given the number of cases in which the Court has 
struck down penalties based in part on this standard, and the impor-
tance which the Court clearly attaches to Eighth Amendment review 
of death penalties, the Court seems to intend something more than 
rational basis review. 
The second standard may implicitly incorporate an alternative-
means proportionality concept.  The argument would be that the 
death penalty is unnecessary and therefore excessive relative to the 
next-most-severe alternative penalty (i.e., LWOP) whenever death 
adds no additional deterrent or other benefit.59  This interpretation 
finds some support in the Court’s earliest death penalty standards,60 
and in its decisions invalidating the death penalty for certain offend-
ers (felony accomplices who played a limited role in the crime, the 
mentally retarded, and offenders under eighteen years old at the 
time of the crime).61  In each of the latter cases, doubt was expressed 
about whether the specified group of offenders was at all deterred by 
the threat of capital punishment, but the Court did not assert that 
 
 56 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
 57 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
 58 See Bruce W. Gilchrist, Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1119, 1147 (1979) (describing a New York Court of Appeals decision that relied on 
rational basis review). 
 59 Several justices and scholars have taken this view of the death penalty generally.  E.g., 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300–02 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 331–32, 
342–59 (Marshall, J., concurring); Margaret R. Gibbs, Eighth Amendment—Narrow Propor-
tionality Requirement Preserves Deference to Legislative Judgment, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
955, 976 (1992) (“‘If there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve 
the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted,’ then this would also contribute to a 
conclusion of disproportionality.”  (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 279)); Michael Herz, 
Nearest to Legitimacy:  Justice White and Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1329, 1355 (2003) (“[W]hat matters in determining whether capital punishment for a 
particular offense is ‘needless’ is the incremental deterrent effect of capital punishment as 
opposed to lengthy, or life-long, imprisonment.”). 
 60 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[P]unishment must 
not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”).  The Gregg opinion also 
stated, “we cannot ‘invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe penal-
ties adequate to serve the ends of penology.’”  Id. at 182–83 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 
451 (Powell, J., dissenting)).  However, the Court’s later cases (Enmund, Atkins, and Roper) 
imply a “less-would-do-just-as-well” approach, at least for certain offenders. 
 61 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798–800 (1982) (accomplices); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 319–20 (2002) (mentally retarded offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
572–73 (2005) (offenders under eighteen). 
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there was no deterrent effect (which would be a no-rational-basis ar-
gument).  If the Court meant to concede the possibility of some de-
terrent effect, its decisions could be justified on a theory of alterna-
tive-means proportionality—the minimal deterrence these offenders 
would experience from the threat of receiving the death penalty is no 
greater than that provided by the threat of the lesser penalty of 
LWOP.  One of these cases, Roper v. Simmons, contains language 
strongly suggesting this alternative-means rationale:  “[t]o the extent 
the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is 
worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a 
young person.”62 
2.  Execution Methods 
In recent years there have been numerous constitutional chal-
lenges to the procedures used to carry out the most common method 
of execution, lethal injection.63  The principal objection to these pro-
cedures is that the three drugs commonly employed and the proce-
dures used to inject them risk causing excruciating pain to offenders 
who are still conscious.  In evaluating this objection, courts appear to 
assume that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits modern 
execution methods known to involve extreme pain (just as it prohib-
its painful ancient methods such as burning a convict at the stake), 
without regard to the offender’s desert, net benefits achieved, or pos-
sible alternative ways of causing death—such methods are banned 
simply because it is wrong to ever treat a person in such a barbaric 
way.  Some courts have further assumed that the Eighth Amendment 
also bars methods which, in operation, involve a risk of inflicting se-
vere pain that is both substantial and unnecessary in light of feasible 
modifications of injection procedures.64 
The prohibition of avoidable risk of severe pain is a form of alter-
native-means proportionality analysis.  It is consistent with the lan-
 
 62 Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 
 63 For an example, see Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006), and cases 
cited therein.  See also Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal 
Injections, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1301 (2007) (analyzing recent challenges to the constitution-
ality of lethal injections and proposing a new standard for method-of-execution claims). 
 64 E.g., Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 974, 981 (“The Eighth Amendment . . . has been con-
strued by the Supreme Court to require that punishment for crimes comport with ‘the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”  (quoting 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 561)). 
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guage in Coker v. Georgia, discussed above, condemning “purposeless 
and needless . . . pain and suffering,” and also with language in the 
small number of Supreme Court decisions involving execution meth-
ods.65 
In Baze v. Rees,66 the Supreme Court upheld Kentucky’s use of the 
three-drug procedure.  However, five of the seven opinions (written 
or joined by seven of the nine justices) agreed that, at least under 
some circumstances, the Eighth Amendment bans procedures involv-
ing a risk of substantial and unnecessary pain.  The least protective 
version of this test is contained in Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality 
opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito; that test would invali-
date a method of execution if the state, “without a legitimate pe-
nological justification,” refused to adopt an alternative procedure 
that is shown to be “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact [will] 
significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.”67 
3.  Prison Sentences 
As is well known, the Court has been very reluctant to invalidate 
lengthy prison terms on Eighth Amendment grounds.  Only one 
prisoner, in Solem v. Helm, has won such a claim in modern times.68  
And in recent years the Court has upheld sentences of shocking se-
verity—life without parole for a first-time offender charged with co-
caine possession (admittedly, involving a very large quantity),69 and a 
mandatory minimum prison term of twenty-five years to life for the 
crime of shoplifting several golf clubs.70 
 
 65 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); see also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 
(1947) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bans “unnecessary pain” during execution); 
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (stating that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits “punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cru-
elty”). 
 66 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). 
 67 Id. at 1532.  At several points, Chief Justice Roberts also suggested that the risk of pain 
must be found to be “objectively intolerable.”  Id. at 1531, 1532, 1535, 1537.  Justices 
Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment, but appeared to reject any consideration 
of unnecessary risk of pain; these two justices maintained that the Eighth Amendment 
only bans methods of execution that are “deliberately designed to inflict pain.”  Id. at 
1556 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 68 See 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (involving a man convicted of writing a check from a fictitious 
account who received life imprisonment due to a South Dakota habitual offender stat-
ute). 
 69 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 70 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) 
(upholding a three-strikes sentence of fifty years to life on two minor shoplifting charges, 
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The Court’s disappointing holdings are matched by equally dis-
appointing reasoning—it is very unclear which proportionality prin-
ciples the Court is applying in these cases.71  The closest the Court has 
come to articulating one or more specific theories of proportionality 
was in Solem.  In his majority opinion in that case, Justice Powell im-
plicitly adopted retributive principles when he stated that the gravity 
of offenses, for Eighth Amendment purposes, depends on two fac-
tors:  the harm caused or threatened to victims or society, and the de-
fendant’s culpability, including his intent and motives.72  In analyzing 
the facts of that case, Powell also stated that the defendant’s record 
included no instance of violence, that a life-without-parole sentence 
eliminated any incentive to address his clear need for alcoholism 
treatment, and that the sentence thus was “unlikely to advance the 
goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial way.”73  There is 
at least a hint of utilitarian proportionality analysis in these com-
ments—either the burdens of the sentence outweigh its probable 
crime-control effects (ends-benefits proportionality), or the same or 
better effects could be achieved with a less severe penalty (alternative-
means proportionality). 
Proportionality principles have also not been well-articulated in 
the numerous dissenting opinions in Supreme Court cases upholding 
severe prison sentences.  But at least two of the three proportionality 
principles identified in this Article are implicit in several of these dis-
sents.  Justice White’s dissent in Harmelin v. Michigan (joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun and Stevens) emphasized the majority’s focus on the 
potential harm that a large amount of drugs could cause, with little or 
no attention to issues of culpability, particularly intent and motive.  
This implies a limiting retributive proportionality analysis.74  Justice 
Stevens’s separate dissent in Harmelin objected to the mandatory na-
ture of the life-without-parole sentence, because it conclusively pre-
sumed the offender and all such offenders to be incorrigible, or that 
society’s interests in deterrence and retribution outweighed rehabili-
tative purposes.75  Stevens felt that any such presumption would be ir-
rational, and that the sentence was therefore capricious; he might, 
instead, have argued that such a severe mandatory penalty is inher-
 
but not directly ruling on Eighth Amendment issues due to the special standards applica-
ble in federal habeas corpus review of state cases). 
 71 See generally Frase, supra note 1 (identifying the different proportionality principles). 
 72 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292–94. 
 73 Id. at 297 n.22. 
 74 501 U.S. at 1009–27 (White, J., dissenting). 
 75 Id. at 1028–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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ently very overbroad—a violation of alternative-means proportional-
ity. 
In later cases, several dissenting justices have also implicitly in-
voked the concept of alternative-means proportionality.  In Ewing v. 
California, Justice Breyer questioned the need for California’s very 
broad three-strikes law.76  The legislature’s goal was to prevent “seri-
ous” and “violent” crimes through deterrence and incapacitation, but 
any felony could constitute a third strike, including many property 
crimes that would not qualify as first or second strikes;77 Breyer thus 
concluded that “Ewing’s 25-year term amounts to overkill” relative to 
the legislature’s goals.78  Similarly, in Lockyer v. Andrade, Justice 
Souter’s dissenting opinion attacked the defendant’s two consecutive 
prison terms, totaling fifty years to life.79  According to the State’s 
briefs, the California law was based on the legislature’s finding that a 
three-strikes offender’s danger to society justified a sentence of 
twenty-five years to life.  Souter argued that it was irrational to assume 
that Mr. Andrade became twice as dangerous when he committed the 
second shoplifting offense that raised his minimum term from 
twenty-five to fifty years.  In other words, the state could not show that 
a twenty-five-year sentence, or at least, a sentence much shorter than 
fifty years, would be inadequate to achieve the state’s asserted inca-
pacitation goals. 
4.  Prisoners’ Rights Cases 
The Court has been only a bit more generous when hearing 
Eighth Amendment claims attacking prison conditions, excessive 
force used to control unruly prisoners, and prison or jail disciplinary 
measures.  In an early case, Estelle v. Gamble, the Court cited language 
from a death penalty case and stated that the Eighth Amendment is 
violated by the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on in-
mates, involving measures lacking any valid penological purpose.80  
However, subsequent prisoners’ rights cases rarely have relied so di-
rectly on Eighth Amendment sentencing standards.  Some lower 
 
 76 538 U.S. 11, 52 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 77 See id. at 51. 
 78 Id. at 52. 
 79 538 U.S. 63, 77–83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 80 429 U.S. 97, 102–04 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint 
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 
346 (1981) (stating that the Eighth Amendment bans “inflictions of pain . . . that are ‘to-
tally without penological justification’” (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183)). 
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court cases from the 1970s used the “unnecessary and wanton” stan-
dard, or a generalized Eighth Amendment “necessity” principle, to 
find certain inmate restraint measures unconstitutional because they 
were much more severe or lasted much longer than they needed to.81  
The emphasis on necessity in these early cases strongly suggested a 
concept of alternative-means proportionality.  A few 1970s cases also 
appeared to apply limiting retributive principles, finding the chal-
lenged prison disciplinary measures to be excessive relative to the se-
riousness of the infractions being punished.82 
In later prisoners’ rights cases, the Supreme Court developed two 
sets of standards specifically designed for inmate mistreatment 
claims.  Each includes both an objective and a subjective component, 
and neither of the standards strongly emphasizes proportionality.83  
Inmate claims of inadequate medical care, failure to protect against 
assault or suicide, harsh prison conditions, and severe disciplinary 
measures require a showing of “deliberate indifference”84 to the in-
mate’s health or safety on the part of prison officials—a standard akin 
to “recklessness” in the criminal law.85  In Rhodes v. Chapman, the 
Court held that the objective component for such claims requires 
deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” 
and added that many unpleasant or even harsh prison conditions will 
fail to meet this standard86—harsh treatment is deemed to be a le-
gitimate part of the penalty.  In a later case, the Court stated that the 
objective component requires deprivation of an “identifiable human 
need such as food, warmth, or exercise,” and the deprivation must 
lack “penological justification.”87 
A different subjective standard applies to claims of excessive force 
by prison officials in restoring order or subduing an unruly inmate.  
According to the Court, a more deferential standard is appropriate 
because the state must balance competing interests—safeguarding 
 
 81 E.g., Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979) (use of tear gas and neck chains); 
Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (lengthy chaining of in-
mates to beds). 
 82 E.g., Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 132–34 (2d Cir. 1972) (extending segregation as a 
punishment for refusing to sign a “safety sheet”); Adams v. Carlson, 368 F. Supp. 1050 
(E.D. Ill. 1973) (extending segregation as a punishment for work stoppage). 
 83 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991) (discussing the prisoners’ rights cases). 
 84 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (“In prison-conditions cases [the] state 
of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety . . . .’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 85 Id. at 839, 847. 
 86 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (upholding double-celling of prison inmates). 
 87 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304, 308. 
  
Dec. 2008] LIMITING EXCESSIVE PRISON SENTENCING 61 
 
the inmate versus protecting staff and other inmates—and officials 
must often act quickly.88  The subjective standard in these cases is 
higher than the recklessness sufficient under the deliberate indiffer-
ence rule:  in excessive force cases, the officials must have acted “ma-
liciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”89  On 
the other hand, the objective component in this context is lower be-
cause, when the “malicious and sadistic” standard is met, “contempo-
rary standards of decency always are violated.  This is true whether or 
not significant injury is evident,” provided the injury is not de mini-
mis.90 
The current standards summarized above are unsatisfactory.  It is 
not clear why a separate subjective element is required in this con-
text, given that Eighth Amendment limits on sentencing and forfei-
tures do not include any such element.  It can be argued that the sub-
jective element is needed in order to transform administrative prison 
measures into “punishment,” but this element is also required for 
prison disciplinary measures clearly intended as (further) punish-
ment.  Another function of this element might be to emphasize the 
need to defer to decisions by prison officials, intervening only when 
such officials act culpably.  But this rationale does not explain why 
the objective standards applied to the treatment of prisoners differ 
not just in degree but in kind from those applied to sentences and 
forfeitures.  Explicit proportionality analysis seems particularly ap-
propriate when evaluating claims of alleged excessive force used to 
subdue or transport an inmate, or unduly severe prison disciplinary 
measures, since the essence of these claims is the alleged excessive-
ness of government measures.91  Application of proportionality prin-
ciples to inmate claims of excessive force and excessive discipline 
would also serve to harmonize excessiveness standards in these cases 
with those applied in analogous, non-prison contexts (i.e., the exces-
sive-force standards applied to seizures of the person under the 
 
 88 See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986) (“[P]rison administrators are charged with 
the responsibility of ensuring the safety of the prison staff, administrative personnel, and 
visitors, as well as the ‘obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of 
the inmates themselves.’”  (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). 
 89 Id. at 320–21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)); see also Hud-
son v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4–7 (1992) (establishing that judges must look at the prison 
official’s motives in punching and kicking a prisoner who was cuffed and shackled and 
being led to the lockdown area). 
 90 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (citation omitted). 
 91 Non-proportionality standards may be more appropriate when applied to certain claims 
(e.g., inadequate medical care, failure to protect, or harsh prison conditions) involving 
measures that are banned as inhumane and a violation of human dignity. 
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Fourth Amendment, and excessive-penalty standards applied to sen-
tences and forfeitures). 
Notwithstanding the formal standards currently applied, many ex-
amples of implicit means proportionality analysis can be found in re-
cent Supreme Court and lower court cases.  In Hope v. Pelzer,92 the Su-
preme Court found an Eighth Amendment violation when an inmate 
who had been disruptive at a chain gang work site was taken back to 
the prison and painfully handcuffed for seven hours to a tall “hitch-
ing post” without adequate water, unprotected from sunburn on his 
shirtless body, and with no bathroom breaks.93  Citing the lack of any 
continuing emergency situation or safety concerns, the Court found 
that this treatment violated the inmate’s dignity and imposed “wan-
ton and unnecessary pain.”94  In Delaney v. DeTella,95 involving con-
finement in a tiny segregation cell for six months with no out-of-cell 
exercise, the Seventh Circuit found that periodic exercise is an essen-
tial human need and that no legitimate concerns (such as the in-
mate’s extreme dangerousness) justified such extended and total de-
nial of exercise.96  In other words, such denial was unnecessary. 
Similarly, in Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia,97 the district court 
found the allegations sufficient to state a claim because the very tight 
handcuffs placed on the plaintiffs for their all-day transport to an-
other prison imposed more pain than was necessary to maintain se-
curity.98 
Explicit proportionality language, as well as implicit means pro-
portionality analysis, was applied in Trammell v. Keane;99 however, in 
that case the Second Circuit concluded that in light of the inmate’s 
many disciplinary violations, the admittedly severe measures were 
warranted by the need to strongly deter and reform the inmate, and 
that these measures “directly and proportionally targeted [his] mis-
conduct.”100  The measures were therefore deemed necessary and 
thus not excessive relative to less severe alternatives. 
As these cases show, courts have often emphasized the “unneces-
sary” or “gratuitous” use of force or discipline, but under the Court’s 
 
 92 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
 93 Id. at 737–45. 
 94 Id. at 738. 
 95 256 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 96 Id. at 683–84. 
 97 466 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 98 Id. 
 99 338 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2003). 
100 Id. at 163, 166. 
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current, two-pronged standards, proportionality principles are at 
most implicit.  Since the gist of many of these claims is excessiveness, 
it would sharpen and improve the analysis if courts explicitly invoked 
proportionality principles, which could still be tailored to reflect con-
text-specific needs. 
5.  Summary 
Of all the government measures subject to Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny, excessively long prison sentences seem to receive the least 
favorable treatment, and are governed by the most opaque standards.  
But in cases from other Eighth Amendment contexts, clear examples 
can be found of the application of implicit limiting retributive, ends-
benefits, and alternative-means proportionality principles.  When liti-
gators, courts, and scholars seek to place meaningful limits on prison 
sentences, they should explicitly invoke these proportionality princi-
ples.  And in response to opposing arguments—that such principles 
invade the prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches, are 
anti-democratic, or are unworkable in practice—proponents of these 
principles should cite the many examples of their application in 
other Eighth Amendment contexts (and elsewhere in United States 
law, as well as in foreign and international law).101 
III.  THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
In other areas of constitutional litigation, it is now well-established 
that courts can and do grant broader protections to citizens under 
state constitutional provisions than are required by the federal consti-
tution.  The “New Federalism” movement has been especially notice-
able in areas, such as the Fourth Amendment, where the U.S. Su-
preme Court has in recent years cut back or refused to recognize 
modest extensions of federal civil rights.  It is very appropriate for 
state courts to recognize broader protections under state law, since 
the decisions of these courts confront no issues of federalism.  More-
over, since state court judges are either directly elected or appointed 
by locally elected officials, decisions invalidating excessive legislative 
and executive actions under state law raise fewer issues of democratic 
legitimacy than when federal judges engage in constitutional review.  
In addition, state constitutions are often worded differently than the 
Eighth Amendment, which gives state courts more leeway to adopt a 
 
101 See generally SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 1; Frase, supra note 1. 
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different interpretation.  Indeed, some state constitutions explicitly 
prohibit disproportional or “excessive” penalties. 
Nevertheless, state court rulings invalidating criminal penalties on 
state constitutional grounds have thus far been rather infrequent.  
This may be at least partly due to defense attorneys being unaware of 
relevant state constitutional provisions and case law; the summaries 
below are an effort to begin to address that problem, and encourage 
litigators, courts, and scholars to be less “Fed-centric.” 
A.  Survey of State Constitutional Provisions Limiting Punishment Severity 
All fifty states have constitutional provisions related to sentencing.  
All but two states, Connecticut and Vermont, have provisions specifi-
cally limiting severe punishments of all kinds.  But both of those 
states have provisions limiting severe fines, and Vermont courts in-
terpret that state’s “proportioned” fines clause to apply to all types of 
penalties.102 
The forty-nine states with express or implied all-penalties provi-
sions fall into five categories: 
(1) Ten states have constitutions which either explicitly or by in-
terpretation require proportionate penalties.  The eight states 
with explicit provisions are Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Vir-
ginia.  Of these states, all but Vermont also have constitutional 
provisions falling into one of the four categories listed below.  
A ninth state, Illinois, has a provision requiring punishment 
“according to the seriousness of the offense” which is com-
monly referred to as the “proportionate penalties clause”103 
(see further discussion in Part III.C, below).  Finally, the 
Washington Supreme Court has interpreted that state’s con-
stitutional ban on cruel penalties (category (3), below) in 
light of proportionality principles recognized in state stat-
utes.104 
(2) Nineteen state constitutions prohibit cruel or unusual penal-
ties, including two states, Maine and New Hampshire, with 
proportionate-penalty clauses (category (1), above).  The 
 
102 State v. Venman, 564 A.2d 574, 581–82 (Vt. 1989). 
103 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
104 See State v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720, 725 (Wash. 1980) (noting that one purpose stated in the 
state penal code is “[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor 
offenses, and to prescribe proportionate penalties for each”  (quoting WASH REV. CODE 
§ 9A.04.020(1)(d) (1980))). 
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other seventeen states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Ha-
waii, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. 
(3) Six state constitutions prohibit cruel penalties (omitting the 
“unusual” element), including one state, Rhode Island, with a 
proportionate-penalty clause.  The other five states are Dela-
ware, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington. 
(4) Twenty-two state constitutions prohibit cruel and unusual 
penalties, including eight states (Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, 
Nebraska, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia), 
which also have a proportionate-penalty clause and/or one of 
the provisions in category (5), below. 
(5) Nine states, all of which are included in one of the four cate-
gories above, have additional state constitutional provisions 
related to excessive penalties or treatment.  Five states—
Indiana, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming—prohibit 
“unnecessary rigor” in the treatment of persons arrested or 
held in custody;105 Georgia prohibits such persons from being 
“abused”; Louisiana’s constitution prohibits “euthana-
sia, . . . torture, or . . . cruel, excessive, or unusual punish-
ment”;106 South Carolina prohibits “corporal” as well as cruel 
or unusual punishment;107 and Alaska recognizes that inmates 
have a right to rehabilitation pursuant to a state constitutional 
provision requiring all criminal administration to be based on 
“the principle of reformation” (as well as on public protec-
tion, community condemnation, victims rights, and restitu-
tion).108 
To summarize:  thirty-five states have constitutional provisions or 
case law standards that differ from the Eighth Amendment—
expressly banning disproportionate penalties, cruel or unusual pun-
ishments, cruel punishments, and/or one of the forms of mistreat-
ment described in category (5), above. 
 
105 See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981) (applying the provision to a search by 
an opposite-sex guard). 
106 LA. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
107 S.C. CONST. art I, § 15. 
108 See, e.g., Abraham v. State, 585 P.2d 526, 530 (Alaska 1978) (remanding for hearings to 
effectuate defendant’s constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment of his alcoholism; 
defendant spoke only Yupik (Eskimo) and alleged there were no prison programs for 
such people); see also ALASKA CONST. art I, § 12. 
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Utilitarian proportionality principles are clearly implied by the 
wording of several state constitutional texts.  The five state constitu-
tions prohibiting “unnecessary rigor” in the treatment of persons in 
custody have thereby recognized an implicit means proportionality 
limitation.  Ends proportionality principles are endorsed in Article 18 
of the New Hampshire Constitution (Part 1), which provides: 
  All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense.  
No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, 
forgery, and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason.  
Where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offenses, 
the people are led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, 
and to commit the most flagrant with as little compunction as they do the 
lightest offenses.109 
The fear that the people will “forget the real distinction” of crimes 
and commit greater crimes with no greater “compunction” invokes 
the norm-reinforcing and marginal deterrent values of penalties pro-
portionate to social harm, both of which are implicit ends-benefits 
proportionality arguments.110 
B.  State Constitutional Case Law Favorable to Defendants 
Cases construing the state constitutional provisions surveyed 
above are as varied as the provisions themselves, and do not always 
track differences in the constitutional text.  Some courts cite such dif-
ferences as grounds for recognizing broader state constitutional pro-
tection, while other courts ignore textual differences and apply fed-
eral constitutional standards.  Courts in states from the first two 
categories above (those with proportionate-penalty clauses, or those 
that prohibit cruel or unusual punishment) seem to be somewhat 
more likely to grant broader protection, but many states in each cate-
gory do not do so.  The reluctance of state courts to grant broader 
protection against excessive penalties under state constitutions is sur-
prising given the frequency with which expanded criminal procedure 
rights are recognized by state courts in other contexts.  For example, 
many courts have given citizens greater protection from searches and 
seizures under state provisions worded similarly or even identically to 
the Fourth Amendment.111 
 
109 N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 18. 
110 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
111 See, e.g., Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994) (rejecting 
the Fourth Amendment rule permitting suspicionless sobriety checkpoint stops of drivers, 
despite the identical wording of the Minnesota and federal constitutional search-and-
seizure provisions).  See generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, 
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Whether or not the state constitution is worded differently, or is 
deemed more protective, numerous cases across a diverse group of 
states have invalidated sentencing provisions or specific sentences 
under state constitutional law.112  Although most courts merely apply 
the Solem framework, some state courts have developed more precise 
proportionality analysis or state-law principles.113  The following are 
examples of some of these state court decisions. 
The California Supreme Court has strongly implied a focus on 
limiting retributive proportionality.  In re Rodriguez held that under 
the state cruel or unusual punishment clause, “the measure of the 
constitutionality of punishment for crime is individual culpability.”114 
In Conner v. State,115 the Indiana Supreme Court held that the 
state’s proportionate penalties clause grants more protection than 
the Eighth Amendment.116  The court further held that the defen-
dant’s six-year sentence for selling a harmless substance represented 
to be marijuana was unconstitutionally disproportionate because it 
was twice as severe as the three-year maximum penalty applicable to 
the sale of real marijuana.  The court therefore vacated the sentence 
and remanded with instructions to impose a sentence of no more 
than three years.117 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, applying that state’s ban on 
“cruel punishment” in Workman v. Commonwealth,118 invalidated sen-
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 1027–43 (4th ed. 2000) (re-
viewing state law expansions of constitutional rights related to search and seizure, inter-
rogation, and other procedural issues). 
112 See generally Howard J. Alperin, Length of Sentence as Violation of Constitutional Provisions Pro-
hibiting Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (2008). 
   Some state cases have struck down sentences under the Eighth Amendment, without 
separate discussion of state constitutional provisions.  E.g., Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 
(Del. Super. Ct. 2003); Wilson v. State, 830 So. 2d 765 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001); People v. 
Gaskins, 923 P.2d 292 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); see also State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64 (Ariz. 2003) 
(invalidating mandatory consecutive sentences totaling fifty-two years without possibility 
of release for statutory rape).  But see State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006), cert. de-
nied., 127 S. Ct. 1370 (2007) (distinguishing Davis and upholding mandatory consecutive 
terms totaling 200 years without release for first-offense possession (downloading) of 
child pornography). 
113  See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
114 537 P.2d 384, 394 (Cal. 1975) (invalidating life sentence given to child molester after de-
fendant had served twenty-two years in prison without release). 
115 626 N.E.2d 803 (Ind. 1993). 
116 Id. at 806.  The defendant was charged under a law, IND. CODE § 35-48-4-4.6 (1993), 
which provided a sentence of up to eight years for sale of any simulated controlled 
substance, regardless of the drug being simulated. 
117 Id. 
118 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). 
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tences of life without parole given to two fourteen-year-old rape of-
fenders.  The court’s decision was based in part on the principle, akin 
to alternative-means proportionality, that a punishment is unconstitu-
tionally excessive if it “[goes] beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
aim of the public intent as expressed by the legislative act 
[or] . . . . exceeds any legitimate penal aim.”119 
In State v. Hayes, the Louisiana Court of Appeal vacated a manda-
tory sentence of life without parole under that state’s cruel or un-
usual punishment clause (but without emphasizing the differences 
between state and federal constitutional texts).120  The court found 
the sentence constitutionally excessive in light of the following facts:  
Hayes’s current offense involved theft of approximately $1,000 from 
his employer; he admitted the crime and returned the $693 still in his 
possession; he had a second job, and that employer thought highly of 
Hayes and believed he could be rehabilitated; his prior crimes were 
mostly minor property offenses; his one “crime of violence” (re-
quired, to impose the life sentence) was a strong-armed robbery and 
theft of a bicycle committed when Hayes was a juvenile; and the pre-
sentence report recommended a sentence of ten years.121 
The general standards invoked in Hayes were that penalties must 
be “meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the grav-
ity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case” and must not be 
“‘disproportionate’ to the harm done [or] shock[] ‘one’s sense of 
justice.’”122  This language suggests the application of both implicit 
limiting retributive principles and ends-benefits proportionality.  Al-
ternative-means proportionality principles were implicit in the court’s 
statement that the trial court’s sentence “imposes an undue burden 
on the taxpayers of the state” in a case where “a severe sentence, for 
example, between twenty and forty years, would have met all of the 
societal goals of incarceration.”123 
In People v. Bullock, the mandatory life-without-parole penalty up-
held by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Harmelin124 was found to 
 
119 Id. at 378.  Holding that the aim of a life without parole sentence is to incapacitate incor-
rigible offenders and that no court could reasonably find that a fourteen-year-old of-
fender will remain incorrigible for the rest of his life. 
120 739 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
121 Id. at 302–03. 
122 Id. at 303–04 (quoting State v. Young, 663 So. 2d 525, 531 (La. Ct. App. 1995); State v. 
Chaisson, 507 So. 2d 248, 250 (La. Ct. App. 1987)). 
123 Id. at 303.  However, a sentence of thirty years hard labor without parole, imposed on re-
mand, was upheld on appeal.  State v. Hayes, 845 So. 2d 542 (La. Ct. App. 2003). 
124 See discussion supra Part II.C.3. 
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violate the Michigan Constitution, in part because that state’s consti-
tution forbids cruel or unusual punishments.125  The Michigan Su-
preme Court implicitly adopted a retributive theory, stressing the de-
fendant’s limited culpability in the absence of any proof of sale or 
intent to sell.  Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Harmelin, the 
Michigan Court refused to hold the defendant responsible for the 
potential harms that might be caused if the large quantity of drugs he 
possessed were converted into individual doses.  The Court held that 
proportionate punishment under the Michigan Constitution “must 
be tailored to a defendant’s personal responsibility and moral guilt”; 
anyone who obtained some of these drugs and caused harm “can and 
should be held individually responsible” for such harm.126 
Sometimes courts cite the state constitution and reach results 
seemingly more generous than what would be expected based on the 
most recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but without expressly 
holding that the state constitution grants additional protection.  For 
example, the Georgia Supreme Court has, in a series of cases, invali-
dated severe penalties under both the Eighth Amendment and the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Georgia Constitution, 
based in large part on post-offense legislative changes substantially 
lowering penalties for the crime in question.  In the most recent case, 
Humphrey v. Wilson,127 the defendant was a seventeen-year-old high 
school student charged with having oral sex with a fifteen-year-old 
student.  Applying the penalties in effect at the time of the crime, the 
trial court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years with 
no possibility of parole, along with required life-long sex-offender 
registration and public notification of the defendant’s status.  One 
year after the crime, the law was changed, making this offense a mis-
demeanor and eliminating the sex-offender registration requirement.  
In striking down these penalties, the state supreme court did not hold 
that the legislative change was retroactive, but rather treated it as an 
important factor in applying the federal and state “evolving standards 
of decency” and gross disproportionality criteria.128 
 
125 485 N.W.2d 866, 872, 876 (Mich. 1992); see also People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 
831–34 (Mich. 1972) (invalidating a mandatory twenty-year minimum sentence).  But see 
People v. Fluker, 498 N.W.2d 431 (Mich. 1993) (holding that Bullock applies to posses-
sion, not drug delivery). 
126 Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 876. 
127 652 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 2007). 
128 Id. at 507–09. 
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C.  Illinois Constitutional Sentencing Standards and Cases 
State constitutional sentencing jurisprudence is particularly well 
developed in Illinois.  Article I, section 11 of the Illinois Constitution 
declares that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined . . . according to the 
seriousness of the offense.”129  The Illinois Supreme Court has con-
cluded that no change in meaning was intended in 1970 when this 
language was substituted for the provision in the prior (1870) consti-
tution which called for penalties to be “proportioned to the nature of 
the offense.”130  Like its predecessor, the current provision is com-
monly known as the state’s “proportionate penalties clause.”131 
A penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if either of 
the following tests is met: 
(1) the penalty “is a cruel or degrading punishment not known to 
the common law, or is a degrading punishment which had 
become obsolete in the State prior to the adoption of its con-
stitution, or is so wholly disproportioned to the offense com-
mitted as to shock the moral sense of the community”;132 or 
(2) the offense has a higher penalty than another offense with 
identical substantive elements.133 
Neither of these tests bears a close resemblance to any of the fed-
eral factors recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm.  
The first test is both narrower and broader than the first Solem factor 
(gross disproportionality between the gravity of the offense and the 
severity of the sentence), and neither of the Illinois tests involves in-
tra- or inter-jurisdictional comparisons (the second and third Solem 
factors).  It should also be noted that, unlike the modified Solem stan-
dards adopted by the plurality opinion in Ewing v. California, the Illi-
nois constitutional provision and interpretive case law focus entirely 
on the defendant’s current offense, without consideration of the se-
riousness of his or her prior record. 
Several proportionality principles may be implicit in the Illinois 
standards.  The final clause of the first Illinois test appears to be 
based on a limiting retributive theory; the language used—“so wholly 
disproportionate as to shock the moral sense of the community”—
 
129 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
130 People v. Sharpe, 839 N.E.2d 492, 500 (Ill. 2005). 
131 Id. 
132 People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 307–09 (Ill. 2002) (quoting People ex rel. Bradley v. Ill. 
State Reformatory, 36 N.E. 76, 79 (1894)). 
133 See People v. Lewis, 677 N.E.2d 830, 831–33 (Ill. 1996) (invalidating penalty for armed 
violence that was greater than penalty for identical offense of armed robbery). 
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suggests a criterion based on blameworthiness, and cases interpreting 
this standard do seem to emphasize offender culpability.134 
The second Illinois test may be based on due process concerns 
(lack of rational basis; potential for abuse of prosecutorial discretion) 
rather than on proportionality, but this test could also incorporate all 
three proportionality principles identified in this Article.  If crimes 
with identical substantive elements receive different penalties, it 
seems very likely that offenders who receive the more severe penalty 
are being punished in excess of their deserts (limiting retributive 
proportionality), and/or that the benefits achieved by the more se-
vere penalty are not worth the greater burdens on defendants (ends-
benefits proportionality), and/or that the lesser penalty is sufficient 
to achieve all relevant sentencing purposes (alternative-means pro-
portionality). 
State constitutional proportionality review has grown steadily over 
time, but sometimes it devolves.  For many years the Illinois Supreme 
Court recognized a third type of state constitutional disproportional-
ity, applicable when two or more offenses have “related” legislative 
purposes, and where “conduct that creates a less serious threat to the 
public health and safety than other conduct is punished more 
harshly.”135  This so-called “cross-comparison test” involved a more 
limited form of intra-jurisdictional comparison than the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s second factor in Solem—only offenses reflecting re-
lated legislative purposes were compared, and the relative severity of 
crimes was tied explicitly to the social harms caused by each crime.  
The focus on harm suggested a theory of utilitarian ends-benefits 
proportionality (which, unlike retributive proportionality, does not 
give substantial weight to offender culpability136). 
After two decades of experience with the cross-comparison pro-
portionality test, the Illinois Supreme Court abandoned that test in 
People v. Sharpe.137  The court concluded that judicial application of 
both prongs of this standard (“related” legislative purposes, and “less 
 
134 See, e.g., Miller, 781 N.E.2d at 307–09 (invalidating life-without-parole sentence given to a 
fifteen-year-old who became an accomplice to murder moments before the shooting, not-
ing that “this case presents the least culpable offender imaginable”).  The other two 
clauses of the first test appear to prohibit severe punishments based on the original 
meaning of the constitutional provision and desuetude. 
135 People v. Davis, 687 N.E.2d 24, 28–29 (Ill. 1997) (invalidating a penalty for failure to have 
a firearm owner’s card that was greater than the penalty for unlawful use of a weapon by a 
felon). 
136 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
137 839 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 2005). 
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serious threat to the public health and safety”) was unworkable and 
invaded the legislative prerogative to define criminal punishments.138  
Perhaps another, unstated reason why cross-comparison review 
seemed too “legislative” is that most of the cases invoking this stan-
dard were, in essence, facial attacks on statutory penalties by means of 
a pretrial motion to dismiss, rather than “as applied” attacks on a par-
ticular sentence imposed. 
As I have argued at greater length elsewhere,139 the Sharpe decision 
is poorly reasoned, broader than necessary, and perhaps of limited 
practical importance (given that the court not only explicitly retained 
the other two Illinois proportionality theories described above, but 
also revived an earlier doctrine, based on due process principles, 
which invalidates any penalty not “reasonably designed to remedy the 
particular evil that the legislature was targeting”140).  Whatever the 
problems that may have arisen in the cases applying the cross-
comparison test, they do not seem insuperable; there were many ways 
in which the Illinois Supreme Court could have modified that test, 
without totally discarding it.  The Indiana Supreme Court seemed to 
have applied, and been quite satisfied with, a similar test in Conner v. 
State, discussed above.141  It is unfortunate that neither of these state 
supreme courts cited any cases from the other state. 
CONCLUSION 
Eighth Amendment litigators, courts, and scholars should resist 
the defeatist assumption that lengthy prison terms cannot be success-
fully attacked on constitutional grounds.  Constitutional sentencing 
proportionality analysis is not dead, even in prison cases; it is only be-
ginning!  Litigators and courts should pay particular attention to the 
possibility of invalidating the sentence on state constitutional 
grounds.  Wider familiarity with state constitutional holdings around 
the country, and with the many ways in which proportionality princi-
ples have been recognized in American (and foreign) law,142 will also 
serve to underscore the broad support for these fundamental pre-
cepts, and the variety of ways in which they can be applied. 
 
138 Id. at 504–05. 
139 See SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 1, at ch. 7. 
140 Sharpe, 839 N.E.2d at 517–18. 
141 See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. 
142 See SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 1. 
